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Artikel ini membahas dinamika perjalanan Islam sebagai salah
satu kekuatan politik Indonesia. Dalam perjalanan sistem politik
Indonesia, Islam bukan saja memainkan perannya sebagai
simbol religi dan filsafat, melainkan telah berfungsi pula sebagai
simbol politik Islam sejarah politik Indonesia. Berbagai
fenomena agama, sosial, politik pada era globalisasi ini baik yang
terjadi di lingkungan domestik dan eksternal Indonesia tetap
akan memiliki signifikansinya pada perkembangan Islam
sebagai kekuatan agama dan politik. Oleh karenanya, posisi
Islam dalam politik Indonesia dan politik global, pada umumnya
akan tetap menjadi sumber perdebatan utama dalam sekularisasi
politik dan agamaisasi politik.
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“If someone is able to separate sugar from its sweetness, he will be able to separate





“The Islamic movement should detach itself from involvement in politics. Islam is a
moral force, a way to promote morality”
(Abdurrahman Wahid).
3
The two quotations, above, clearly suggest an endless debate aboutthe political role of Islam in Indonesia's politics. This article
discusses the role of political Islam in Indonesian politics and the dynamics
4
of the interaction between the Muslim society and the State in the
Indonesian political system. However, the extent to which the Islamic as a
“religio-politics” factor played a significant role in Indonesian has been
5
subject to debate. Therefore, this article will assess the hypothesis that
“government's policies are also influenced by the religious views and beliefs
of policymakers and their constituents”.
It is widely agreed that world politics has changed so rapidly and
dramatically since the end of the Cold War era. To be more specific, the
management of global politics has been dramatically challenged by the new
strategic enviroment following the September 11 terrorist attack. The rapid
changes in world politics, of course, pose a tremendous challenge for any
nation-states, particularly in new countries such as Indonesia, in managing
the process of democratization. At this point, the role and the task of the
state in managing its national affairs is becoming more crucial and more
complicated as it is sometimes required to deal with problems beyond its
normal sphere of competence.
During the Soeharto era as MacIntyre argued, the policy making was
heavily 'state-centred'. As a result, the possibility for 'extra-state actors'
(society, for example) to play a major role in policy formulation was very
limited. It was due to two main strategies which were applied by the
7
Soeharto's regime: , aimed to co-opt the larger society intoinclusionary
conditional participation in domestic political process which was
principally controlled by the State; and , seek to mitigate or evenexclusionary
deny the role of society in influencing the wider political community
through political repression.
The resignation of President Soeharto In May 1998 which was then
followed by the mushrooming of Islamic political parties and Islamic
radical groups in Indonesia has propelled a bigger role of wider society in
policy making process. This phenomenon was believed to be one of the
crucial indicators of dramatic changes in Indonesia's domestic political




The discussion of this article is divided into several parts. The first part
will delineate the role of Islam in Indonesian politics. The discussion on
this section is structured on several subdivisions, such as the position of
political Islam during the New Order era (Soeharto era), the establishment
of ICMI as the new political legitmacy for the New Order, and the re-
8
emergence of political Islam in the post-Soeharto's politics. The rise of
political Islam and the globalization era is discussed in the next section .
Political Islam and Indonesia's Political System: A brief Review of
Indonesia's Politics.
Political Islam itself is a modern phenomenon. Many studies revealed
that it has roots in the sociopolitical conditions of Muslim countries in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the history of Islamic involvement
9
in Indonesia's politics, most of it has been colored by the tension and
conflict between the government/the ruling authorities (State) and Islam
(Society) and between society itself particularly between Islam and non-
Islam. From the pre-independence to the post-Soeharto period, Indonesian
Muslims utilised Islam both as their banner of resistance to colonialism,
exploitation, repression and as a source of (religious) nationalism. It is often
argued that during the Soeharto's authoritarian New Order, for instance,
Islam became more radical than ever before.
Those periods also marked disunity among Indonesian Muslims. As
the Islamic world is not monolithic, Islam in Indonesia was also split along
“ideological and generational line” which divided Indonesian Islam into
10
different Muslim communities, such as: Modernists and Traditionalists;
radicals and moderats; Shiah and Sunni; and the level of religious
consciousness among them, as labelled by Geertz, in andAbangan, Santri
Priyayi. In doing so, Indonesia's Muslim society is neither a monolithic
community nor a single political entity. The following sections elaborate the
dynamics of state-society relations in Indonesia's politics.
The New Order and Islamic Community: A Fragile Alliance and
Controlled Participation.
In the beginning of the New Order era, the government perceived
Islam as “the most important civil force in society”. Together with the
11
army, Islamic groups were the largest political forces which strongly
supported the New Order in crushing the communists. The 1966-1969
period was a “honeymoon” between the government, military, students and
anti communist groups, including Islamic organizations.
12
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However, in expecting that its political power in the period of the New
Order would increase, the Muslim community had seriously miscalculated.
The military/ABRI (now TNI), which was dominated by officers from
(secular) nationalist group, still had the perception that Islam could threaten
political stability and that the Muslim community still wanted to establish an
Islamic state. The “temporary alliance” between the New Order and the
Muslims was over in 1969 particularly when government attention was fully
concentrated on the 1971 general election.
13
As Ramage explained, there are at least three characteristics of the New
Order's changing perceptions of Islam in 1970-1980s. First, the defeat of
communism in Indonesia left Islam as the only major ideological alternative
to the New Order itself. Second, the New Order government still had a
strong perception of the possibility of the intention of Islamic parties to
impose the establishment of an Islamic state, or at least, the
implementation of Islamic laws in government policies. Lastly, since the
Pancasila asas tunggalhad become or the sole foundation of all organizations
in 1982, then political development should be put behind the need to
accelerate the pace of economic development. In other words, the New
Order regime put economic development and political stability as the top
priority of national development. Anti-political Islamic attitudes, then,
crystallized in the New Order regime, particularly the military. As Liddle
noted, this attitude of the New Order to the political Islam led to the
perception of Islam as “political enemy number two” after communism.
14
The New Order regime produced several policies to eliminate the
possibility of political instability which were categorized by many Muslims
as anti Islam. The policies, as Santoso argued, were aimed at positioning
15
Islam on the periphery of Indonesia's political life. The perception of Islam
as a threat to the political system of the New Order pushed the regime
together with the military to adopt a policy of containmentand of the de-
politicisizing of Islam.
One strategy applied by the New Order to contain Islam as a political
power was “divide and rule”. The major aspect of this strategy was that
16
Islam could continue to develop its religious and cultural dimensions
without entering the political arena (de-politicisation of Islam). This policy
caused 'internal conflict' among Muslims in which, as Starkey argued,
Soeharto successfully divided the Islamic community.
17
The inability of Islam to further play a significant role in politics
domestic and international was due to the absence of any strong political




This was not only because of internal conflict within Islamic groups but,
more importantly, because the government successfully prevented the
emergence of such an organization. Even though PPP was the only Islamic
political party, it was unable to unite all Indonesian Muslims. This was
mainly due to PPP being established by the New Order. Deliar Noer notes
that numerous Islam organizations such as the government sponsored
Indonesian Council of , the Council of the Propagation of Islam,Ulama
and other social organizations like NU and Muhammadiyah had failed to
represent Indonesian Muslims' interests. In this context, as Hassan argued,
19
the relationship between the state and religion is influenced by the internal
dynamics of Muslim societies.
20
Despite the New Order regime's success in de-politicizing Islam, in the
late 1980s a revival of Islam as a political force was underway, particularly
among the young generation. Some observers believed that one of the
factors behind the re-emergence of political Islam was the demands of the
Muslim community for a stronger political voice in domestic politics.
21
Another important factor was the Iranian revolution. But others argued
22
that the most important factor was the change in Soeharto's perception of
the Muslim community, as discussed in the following section.
The Establishment of ICMI: the Revival of Political Islam or
New Source of Political Legitimacy for the New Order?
From the late 1980s to the 1990s, Soeharto changed his domestic policy
and tried to re-build a stronger political coalition with Islam by introducing
an Islamization strategy. This strategywhich focused on “the accentuation
23
of Islamic symbols in public discourse and the accomodation of religious
socio-political powers” --was believed by many scholars as a way of
24
Soeharto's regime to contain the spread of it's crisis of legitimacy after
more than two decades of power. As part of it, the Soeharto's regime
introduced the Islamic Court Bill, Islamic sharia banks and the presidential
decree of the Compilation of Islamic Law.
25
There were two major reasons for Soehato's policy changes to Islam.
The first was Soeharto's political need to respond to what he perceived to be
declining political support for him from the military. Much like his
predecessor who once looked to the communists to counteract unhappy
army officers, Soeharto looked to Islam to play the same role. The second
reason was the external impact of the political revival of Islam globally.
From the late 1970s and early 1980s, Islam popularity began to rise
significantly in Indonesia. As a source of spiritual, ethical, social, and
759
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political advice, the Islamic revival in Indonesia was also part of a
movement occurring throughout the world, in places such as in Iran and
Egypt.
The major result of this new relationship between Islam and the New
Order occurred in December 1990 when Dr. B.J Habibie, the Minister of
Research and Technology, with the support of President Soeharto
established and chaired ICMI ( orIkatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia
Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals). ICMI played a
26
significant role in sponsoring the expansion of the authority of Islamic
courts, greater Muslim programming on television (including lessons in the
Arabic language), the appointments of ICMI leaders to high offices such as
cabinet ministries and provincial governorships, the establishment of the
Islamic Bank in 1991, the and the Center ofMuamalat Abdi Bangsa Foundation
Information and Development Studies (CIDES), considered the
association think tank, as well as the Islamic daily newspaper .Republika
27
With all the above instruments of ICMI, Islam was becoming more
assertive politically and economically.
The establishment of ICMI, as Liddle has argued, was the clearest
28
step taken by Soeharto in accomodating the desires and sensitivities of the
Muslim community and deepening his own identification with Islam. Even
though the establishment of ICMI invited some public debates and
controversies, ICMI, which gained support from almost all government
29
officials and prominent Muslim political activists and intellectuals, can be
regarded as the “sign of the new centrality of Islam in Indonesian public
life”. He further argued that the establishment of ICMI was a mere
30
political tool of those in power. Moreover, it was also a “political move by
the government” which accidentally met a Muslim community demand for
a greater position in politics.
31
The establishment of ICMI was actually an illustration of the
'accommodation' policy of Soeharto in managing the Indonesian Islamic
community. This policy aimed to please the Muslim community in order to
have it express its support and loyalty toward the existing power holder.
However, even though the pressure of the Islamic community was getting
stronger in policymaking, Soeharto still had the ultimate authority to
control it for the sake of his political interests.
Some elements of the Islamic community such as Nadhalatul Ulama,
and the military, however, strongly resisted the creation of ICMI. KH
Abdurrahman Wahid of NU contended that “I am ready anytime to enter
and join ICMI, if the fundamentalists, the militants, do not control it, if
760
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Professor Habibie does not use it for group interest politics". These critics
32
perceived ICMI “not as a vehicle for Muslim penetration of the state but for
state penetration of Islam” .
33
In the military itself, there was also resistance to acknowledging ICMI
due to the fear of re-politicising the Islamic community. The secular-
34
nationalist faction of ABRI perceived that the establishment of ICMI
would push the reemergence of Islam as a political force in Indonesian
politics which in turn would jeopardize political stability and national unity.
This faction also suspected the revival of Islam as indicated by the
establishment of ICMI “would re-open old and divisive debates on whether
Indonesia should be an Islamic state”. This resistance led to the creation,
35
initiated by Gen. Edy Sudrajat, of ICKI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Kebangsaan
Indonesia or the Association of Indonesian Nationalist Intellectuals) which
was non-sectarian. However, this association did not get approval from
President Soeharto until it changed its name to PCPP (Persatuan Cendekiawan
Pembangunan Pancasila, Intellectuals' Association for the Advancement of
the ). It was mainly because the former name of the associationPancasila
36
could give a negative image to the public that there was a conflict between
the military and the Indonesian Muslims.
This phenomenon indicated that there were endless suspicions by the
military of the emergence of Islam as a major political force in Indonesian
politics which they perceived could jeopardize national unity and stability.
Moreover, this also reflected the competition for power between the
Muslim community and the secular-nationalists in the military in the policy
making of the New Order regime.
Political Islam and The post Soeharto's politics.
Despite the marginalisation of political Islam during most of the
Soeharto era, one of the major developments that may have a significant
impact on state-society relations in the late New Order period was the
revival of of Islamic-oriented middle-class politics. The young Islamic
37
generation began to significantly speak about the need for a greater role for
Islam in domestic politics and foreign policy making.
The fall of Soeharto in May 1998 has opened up new opportunity for
political Islam to re-enter to Indonesia's politics. This was indicated, for
38
instance, by the establishment of new Islamic political parties and their
participation in June 1999 General Election. Many of new political parties
adopted Islam as their ideological orientation and utilized Islam as their
political linkage between the party, Muslim communities and the state. As
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Rabasa argued this period also produced political disorder which created
tactical alliance between some elite and military factions and Islamist
extremist to expand their political influence in policy making and
implementation.
39
The most interesting feature of the establishment of new Islamic
political parties is that most of the parties do not endorse the creation of
Islamic state as their primary objectives but to advocate Islamic values as a
source of inspiration in democratisation discourse.
40
The resignation of Soeharto, on the other hand, also provided a significant
momentum for the emergence of Muslim radical groups, such as Forum
Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Waljama'ah (FKWAJ) with its paramilitary
group, Laskar Jihad, Front Pembela Islam (FPI or the paramilitary force of
the Defender of Islam), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (the Indonesian
41
Holy Warrior paramilitary force) which is chaired by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir
(now under police detention for his alleged involvement in the Bali
bombing), and the Jama'ah al-Ihkwan al-Muslimin (JAMI) and the Front of
Hizbullah.
Many of them are new groups which have emerged since the
interregnum of President B.J Habibie. These groups tend to adopt literal
interpretation and understanding Islam. There are reports that members of
the leadership have been close to certain Army Generals, sponsored, or at
least assisted, by certain circles within the “Green” faction of the
Indonesian military. Moreover, these groups have been untilized by this
42
faction to justify its own political agenda. The major of goal of these
43
groups is to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia or, at least, to implement
Islamic law (Shariah) as a statae ideology in Indonesia.
However, the main reasons of the increased radicalism of these groups
were the government's failure to enforce the law and solve a number of
ethno-religious conflicts, and the rampant corruption at all levels of society.
Therefore, Azra points out that one of the important solutions to mitigate
the rise of radicalism was “ to restore government authority and re-
strengthen law enforcement agencies”. Besides that, another scholar also
44
reveals that the rise of these radical groups was “a consequence of
interrelated developments at both domestic and the international levels…
and a combination of different factors, both religious and political, in
forging its activism and militancy”. Eventhough it is important not to
45
overemphasize the role of violent radical groups, these groups have
performed an alternative voice in the policymaking process in which cannot
be abandoned at all by the state.
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Martin Van Bruinessen has appropriately commented on radical
Islamic groups in Indonesia under four regimes in Indonesia by arguing
that:
…Of the post Soeharto governments, Habibie's depended even
more on the support of the Islamist than Soeharto did, and it was
under him that radical Muslims were given arms and were employed
as paramilitary auxiliaries of the police and army. Abdurrahman
Wahid had to face these violent radical groups and attempted to
bridle them but failed because of his weak control over the armed
forces. There was little doubt that the armed groups were sponsored
and given free rein by Wahid's military and civilian opponents.
President Megawati has even less legitimacy in the eyes of the
Muslim radicals, not only because she is a woman but also because
her party is perceived to be dominated by anti Muslim elements. This
has given the conservative Muslim elements in her coalitions extra
leverage, that may result in some Islamizing measures. It has also
made her dependent on, if not hostage to, the military. The arrest of
Jaffar Umar Thalib in may 2002 and the absence of serious protests
against it suggest that it may well possible to contain the radical
groupsbut at the cost of the military's return to power.
46
Globalisation and the rise of Political Islam.
As discussed above, the rise of many Islamist radical movements in
Indonesia initially emerged in the wake of specific social and political crises
in the Muslim world, particularly as a societal-political phenomenon. Yet,
47
they are also a result of the politics of globalisation. In the words of
48
Holton, the revival of political Islam in many Muslim countries could be
interpreted either as “a deglobalising trends towards localism and
regionalism, or as a reglobalising movement challenging the credentials of
Western approaches to globalisation”. In other words, the political Islam
49
in this respect is simultaneously global, regional, national, and locally
specified. To borrow the study of Angel M. Rabasa et al (RAND Corp), the
sources of Islamic Radicalism can be classified into three classes:
conditions, process and catalytic events as follow:
50
The Sources of Islamic Radicalism
Conditions Failed political and economic models
Structural anti-westernism
Decentralization of religious in Sunni Islam
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Processes The Islamic resurgence
Arabization of the non-Arab Muslim world
External funding of religious fundamentalism
and extremism
The convergence of Islamism and tribalism
Growth of radical Islamic networks
Emergence of the mass media
The Palestinian-Israeli and Kashmir conflicts
Catalytic events The Iranian revolution
The Afghan war
The Gulf war 1991
September 11 and the global war on terrorism
The Iraq war 2003
On the other side, the revival of political Islam can also be seen as a
unifying factor and a focal point for the rallying political resistance against
the international system and the State itself in the era of globalisation. In
other words, the globalisation of Islamic revival can also be interpreted as a
part of domestic as well as trans-national and international process. It was
51
basically a response to the global conspiracy against Islam or global
hegemony of the Western world, particularly the US. Since the end of
Second World War, the US has been taking positions of dominance and
hegemony in the Muslim world. The West exercised its influences through
52
a variety of financial and military means a good deal of hegemony on the
internal politics of Muslim countries, including support for regimes that are
less supported by the majority of their own people. The Islamic revival was
53
also a refusal to the process of political and cultural homogenisation of the
Western world .
54
The significant rise of political consciousness of Islamic organizations
in many part of both Muslim and non-Muslim countries, for example, is
one of the crucial indicators of the Islamic revival in the last decade. This
also may lead to the effort of the establishment of the “non-territorial
Islamic state” or the cross border flows of political Islam between
55
(Muslim) groups/entities operating in different countries. This
56
phenomenon concurrently applies with the proposition of 'the
hyperglobalist thesis' that new forms of religious (social) political
organizations will supplant traditional nation-states as the primary political
units of world society.
57
The Indonesian domestic political map has significantly changed when
the political awareness of the Muslim community, the number of Islamic
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political parties and groups have significantly increased in the late 1990s.
The political Islam which was represented by some Islamic radical groups
has also been used as political symbols and a marker of political identity in
policy making process and even in certain foreign policy implementations.
So far, Indonesia has been a shining example of democracy for developing
countries and “Islamic countries. Yet, a strategy to implement the vision of
democratization agenda in Indonesia's foreign policy, to a large extent, will
be based upon consensus building between the state and the larger society
as well as the domestic and international level. In this context, the degree of
“secularization of polity” and “religionalization of polity” concerning the
relationship between the state and society (religious community) at the
national level will remain debatable in the making of Indonesia's foreign
policy in the post Soeharto era.
Anak Agung Banyu Perwita
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